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An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law. By Roscoe Pound. New Haven,
Yale University Press; London, Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press,
1922. PP. 307.
This volume contains a series of six lectures delivered on the Storrs founda-
tion at the Yale Law School and is a worthy addition to the many series previ-
ously delivered on this foundation by leaders of juristic thought. Dean Pound
first defines for us the Function of Legal Philosophy; then follow chapters on
the End of Law, the Application of Law, "Liability," Property, and Contract.
Perhaps the chief criticism to which philosophers of the past have been sub-
ject is that they have presented their very finite wisdom as if it were infinite,
that in a world of constant evolutionary adjustment to an ever changing environ-
ment they have claimed a universal and eternal validity for their rules and
explanations. They have sought to give us an "ultimate solving idea," "a moral
and legal and political chart for all time," "a perfect law which should stand
fast forever." Dean Pound says that we are not to "scoff at this ambitious
aim"; but this means only that criticism should be polite and that the critic
should first demolish his own glass house. The following quotation indicates the
view of the author: "philosophies of law have, been attempts to give a rational
account of the law of the time and place, or attempts to formulate a general
theory of the legal order to meet the needs of some given period of legal develop-
ment, or attempts to state the results of the two former attempts universally
and to make them all-sufficient for law everywhere and for all time. Historians
of the philosophy of law have fixed their eyes chiefly on the third. But this
is the least valuable part of legal philosophy."
He proceeds to state for us the contribution to legal philosophy of the Greeks,
the Romans, the Middle Ages, the age of colonization, and the 19th century,
there being alternation between periods of growth, when theories of "natural
law" have prevailed, and periods of consolidation or reaction, when emphasis
was put upon authority and the law was regarded as complete and in need of
nothing that could not be supplied by history and analysis.
Philosophies, theories of law and its purpose, grow out of the particular needs
and activities of men at any given time and place. Thus, primitive theory is
that the end of law is the keeping of the peace. The Greeks, Romans, and the
Middle Ages regarded it as the maintenance of the social status quo. In the
age of discovery and expansion it was the maximum of liberty. Since Igo it has
been the maximum satisfaction of wants and the relative valuation of these.
We now distinguish between factual wants and legal rights and privileges,
arriving at the latter by a conscious compromise. The question now is, how are
we to weigh conflicting interests and effect the compromise. There is no definite
answer ready to be given.
The lecture on the Application of Law is a discussion of the methods by which
the courts have tried to apply rules of law to cases so as to square with the
mores, the current notions of justice and morality. The author stresses the
necessity of rules and the equal necessity of disregarding them on occasion. He
argues that the public must be educated up to a proper conception of the func-
tion of the judge as that of logical interpreter in the main, but also and in a
large degree that of administrator and legislator as well. The dogma of separa-
tion of powers cannot control; it results merely in a division of labor. Especi-
ally is this true in periods of growth like the present. The judge can no longer
merely apply a "rule." In many fields, cases are unique and cannot be decided
merely by a rule. They have to be decided by application of a "standard"--as,
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for example, that of the reasonably prudent man-and standards change much
faster than rules. He is a wise judge who can maintain the proper balance
between "rule" and "discretion." As justice becomes "individualized," rules
become undermined and uncertain, respect for law declines, and a demand begins
to be heard for restatement and simplification.
In the lecture on "Liability," that term is chosen to express the relation of
right and duty between two persons, the discussion being limited in the main
to the field of torts. The most striking part of this discussion lies in the asser-
tion-surely correct-that to base liability for negligence upon "fault," "blame-
worthiness," or "culpability" is to base it upon a "dogmatic fiction"' "Is an act
blameworthy because the actor has a slow reaction time or was born impulsive
or is naturally timid or is easily 'rattled' and hence in an emergency does not
come up to the standard of what a reasonably prudent man would do in such
an emergency, as applied ex post facto by twelve average men in the jury box?"
"But what the law is really regarding is not his culpable exercise of his will
but the danger to the general security if he and his fellows act affirmatively
without coming up to the standard imposed to maintain that security." This
is sound and true, but it cuts deeper than may appear; it affords the explanation
of morality as well as of negligence. "Fault' ceases to be a "dogmatic fiction"
as soon as we realize that it is merely a failure to come up to a standard and
that any kind of immorality is the same. Our standards of morality are based
upon the experience of the race and are so strongly believed to be necessary to
survival that those who cannot live up to them are penalized, regarded with
dislike, and gradually edged off the earth.
It would help all of our lawyers, radical and conservative alike, if they would
read and could understand Dean Pound's discussion of property and contract.
They, too, are merely evolutionary adjustments through the long centuries. His
last word on property is as follows:
"We may believe that the law of property is a wise bit of social engineering in
the world as we know it, and that we satisfy more human wants, secure more
interests, with a sacrifice of less thereby than by anything we are likely to devise-
we may believe this without holding that private property is eternally and
absolutely necessary and that human society may not expect in some civilization,
which we cannot forecast, to achieve something different and something better."
The doctrine of consideration is treated with an intelligent insight that is
indeed rare if not unequalled. He comes to about the same conclusion as did
Professor Lorenzen with respect to the doctrine of causa in the Roman law.
Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts (IgIg) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
621. "Projects for 'restatement of law' are in the air. But a restatement of
what has never been stated is an impossibility and as yet there is no authoritative
statement of what the law of consideration is." It is true that past definitions
and historical explanations and philosophical theories of consideration are inade-
quate for the law as it is being applied to-day. But no worthy "restatement"
will ever merely copy past "statements." It must, instead, bring the statements
up even with the applications. Dean Pound's lecture will be very helpful in
doing this.
Of course, philosophical theories greatly influence the actual decisions; but
they do this only because they never precede but are based upon decisions.
They are the afterthoughts, frequently lame and halting ones, following upon
mass movements of many individuals in their conscious and unconscious adjust-
ment to conditions about them. The courts are reacting to the feelings and
opinions of the community and are building a law of consideration. The process
is continuous and never ending. A new "philosophical theory of enforcement
of promises" will help, if it truly explains what the courts have already done
and accurately predicts that which they are going to do.
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Dean Pound's lectures are not easy reading; but those who know enough to
be able to read with understanding will be rewarded with many new and enlight-
ening ideas. Few other jurists of to-day are so broadly familiar with past tradi-
tion as he or so thoroughly emancipated from its shackles.
ARTHR= L. ComniN
Yale University School of Law
The Supreme Court in United States History. By Charles Warren. In Three
Volumes. Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1922. Vol. I, pp. xvi, 540;
Vol. II, 1-55o; Vol. III, 1-532.
An adequate history of the Supreme Court has been long awaited. Biogra-
phies of members of the Court have multiplied-some notable biographies. Two
attempts have been made to trace the history of the Court through the lives of
the Chief Justices. Laborious treatises have been written on the law as
expounded by the Court. Monographs without number have analyzed the deci-
sions of the Court. A socialist writer has recorded his impressions of the inter-
ests which seem to him to have affected the utterances of the federal judges.
But no attempt has been made on the scale of the work before us to treat the
Supreme Court as a continuous institution whose history is inseparably inter-!
twined with the general development of American society. In his preface and
introductory chapter, however, the author of these three volumes carefully
delimits his subject and warns his readers not to demand more than he has to
give. And it would be a surly critic indeed who would censure him for not
attempting what he has expressly refrained from doing. Surely an author may
choose his own task!
The reviewer feels bound, nevertheless, to record his disappointment that only
tvo chapters out of the thirty-eight are devoted to the history of the Court within
the last thirty years-in many respects the most important epoch since Chief
Justice Marshall laid the foundations of American constitutional law. If the
author felt any distrust of his own fitness for writing the history of this highly
controversial period, the reviewer would like to demur. In his opinion no one
could have entered upon this last phase with surer step and greater poise than
the author of these volumes.
Another disappointment is in store for some readers of this work. This is
not a history of American constitutional law as expounded by the federal judici-
ary, but a history of the Supreme Court in American history. It is an attempt
to correlate the work of the Court at different epochs with the general history
of the country-"an attempt to revivify the important cases decided by the Court
and to picture the Court itself from year to year in its contemporary setting."
It has seemed to the author perhaps just as important--certainly just as interest-
ing-to know what people thought and felt about the decisions of the Court,
as to ascertain the legal grounds for those decisions. Unquestionably it is
highly desirable to know how the public reacted to the decisions of the Court on
controverted questions. The revulsion of public opinion in the North from the
Dred Scott decision (I856, U. S.) ig How. 393, is a circumstance of great import-
ance in ante-bellum political history, irrespective of the effect of the decision
upon the future of slavery in the territories. Or, to take a more modern instance,
the decision of the court in Lockner v. New York (i9o5) 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup.
Ct 539, has more than a legal interest to students of American politics. The
protest of labor has had direct political consequences and the animus of labor
may quite conceivably have reacted in subtle ways upon the judiciary, as well
as upon other organs of the government.
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It is this interaction between court and people which interests the author
primarily. In this fascinating study he has displayed prodigious industry, for
what we like to call public opinion is not always apparent nor, indeed, always
easily detected. It may find expression in public utterances or in private corre-
spondence, in pamphlets or in newspapers, in emotional news items or in thought-
ful editorials. All these sources,-except for the latter portions of our history,
when the task becomes extremely laborious,-have been exploited by the author.
A great part of these three volumes consists of quotations from various sources,
printed in extenso with running comments.
It must not be supposed, however, that the author conceives his r6le to be
that of editor merely. There are valuable contributions to legal history scattered
here and there through the volumes, often unobtrusively tucked away in foot-
notes. An instance in point is the discovery of reports of the federal circuit
courts which show that in several cases, as early as 1792, they declared state
statutes invalid because repugnant to the Constitution, "without any apparent
contemporary, criticism." (Vol. i, pp. 65 ff., and footnotes.)
Much attention has been, given naturally to the changing personnel of the
Court. "The Court is not an organism dissociated from the conditions and his-
tory of the times in which it exists. It does not formulate and deliver its
opinions in a legal vacuum. Its Judges are not abstract and impersonal oracles,
but are men whose views, are necessarily, though by no conscious intent, affected
by inheritance, education, and environment and by the impact of history past
and. present!' (Vol. I,, p. 2). True, and just because judges are but men, we
should like to, know more than the author tells us about them. We are left in
no doubt as.to, their political predilections; we are taken into the private councils
of Presidents and allowed to observe the embarrassing circumstances which
affected appointments. But of those subtle influences of tradition and economic
circumstance which may have shaped individual decisions, little is said. The
author is a, frank admirer of the Supreme Court as an institution. It has erred,
no doubt, but its voice in the long run seems to have been vox del. But why
have there been so few unanimous decisions? Why so many dissenting opinions?
Why is it that rational men, can differ so radically on points of law? The
obvious answer is that the personal equation inevitably obtrudes. Here is a
great field of economic-legal research awaiting the patient student. Modem
psychology and the social sciences have much to suggest by way of hypothesis.
A series of studies into the basic conditions which have shaped important deci-
sions may persuade even the staunchest legalist that, as Mr. Justice Holmes has
said, "the felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which
Judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed." (Quoted
with approval by the author, Vol. I, p. 2.)
In conclusion it should be said that these three handsome volumes are a delight
to the eye. The typography leaves nothing to be desired.
ALLEN JOHNSON
Yale University
Cases on the Law of Bills and Notes. By Howard L. Smith and Wm. Underhill
Moore. American Casebook Series. Second Edition. St. Paul, West Publish-
ing Company, 1g2. pp. xvi, 847.
A radical change in arrangement would neither be expected nor desired 'in
the second edition of a casebook which has had a successful career of twelve
years. If a volume is properly to be denominated as a second edition, it will
BOOK REVIEWS 519
necessarily be built upon the groundwork of the firs%, finding its raison d'etre
in the insertion of new material, and in the rearrangement of those chapters
which experience has shown to require it.
This is exactly the process which the present volume has undergone, with
a distinct increase in usefulness in the field for which it was designed. The
number of new cases inserted is relatively small-about fifty in the entire book.
In general these have replaced older cases illustrating not quite so adequately
the same points. In particular, various cases decided before the general adop-
tion of the Negotiable Instruments Law have been removed in favor of similar
cases decided since. In three chapters, the material has been rearranged: in
the Introduction, cases dealing with the transferability of chattels, choses in
action, and bills of lading have been omitted; the liability of the acceptor has
been further developed from the American point of view by the exclusion of
English cases defining the fictitious or non-existent payee, and the inclusion of
more recent cases under the Negotiable Instruments Law; the cases dealing
with delivery as between the immediate parties have been placed first in the
chapter on Delivery, a more logical arrangement. Further, the editors have
added cases involving collateral notes, and notes containing a statement of the
transaction out of which the instrument arose. To a rather slight extent the
footnotes have been cut down by the omission of "accord" and "contra" cases.
In view of the doubtful value of such references in competition with the various
annotations of the N. I. L., this seems an improvement. In short, the book
has been improved by being brought down to date, without changing the classi-
fication of subject-matter originally adopted.
It is natural to question, in going over a second edition of this sort, whether
the original arrangement is precisely the most desirable for the present teaching
of the subject-whether the past twelve years have shown us any new approaches
to the study of Bills and Notes by cases which should be reflected in the case-
book. One suggested basis for a reallocation of the topics of commercial law
for presentation in law schools is the so-called functional division, already used
or attempted in some of the many casebooks on Business Law recently pro
duced. See, for example, 2 Spencer, Law and Business (1921) 295 et seq.;
Schaub and Isaacs, The Law in Business Problem.s (1921) ch. lO. It is said that
the foci for the arrangement in a law school curriculum of branches of the law
dealing with commercial activities should be the general problems with which
business men are dealing; that under such a general classification of business
problems should be grouped the various legal tools a business man may use,
treated with reference to their availability for accomplishing the result he desires,
rather than with reference to the peculiarities of their individual historical
development. On such a basis, Bills and Notes would naturally fall in as one
of the subdivisions of the general topic of credit devices. This general topic
would divide itself into (i) legal devices for obtaining credit; (2) legal devices
for security. Although the following topics have certain characteristics belong-
ing to both main divisions, under (i) might be correlated bills, notes, checks,
stocks and bonds; under (2) liens, pledges, mortgages, conditional sales, bills
of lading, warehouse receipts, and contracts of guaranty and suretyship. Most
of these topics are not now collected into a single credit or security course, but
rather are treated as incidental parts of such subjects as Private Corporations,
Personal Property, or Sales. Assuming that some such functional division as
that suggested might be worth trying, we have two additional types of credit
instruments which should be discussed to some extent along with bills, notes,
and checks, and a number of other types to be correlated in a "Security" course
which we need not consider here. To what extent, then, should stocks and
bonds be divorced from the course on Private Corporations and inserted in the
Credit course? Shares of capital stock serve two obvious functions: they rep-
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resent an interest in the corporation, and their use enables the corporation to
raise money for its business. The former of these functions-the rights, powers,
privileges, and liabilities of an owner of some interest in the corporation-per-
haps better belongs to the field of business associations, the latter to the field
of credit. In the suggested course on Credit, then, stocks and bonds would be
considered with reference to their legal advantages and disadvantages as credit
instruments as compared with bills, notes, and checks, particularly from the
holder's point of view..
It has already been indicated that the present volume is up-to-date, and is
very- well suited for the customary presentation of the course in Bills and Notes.
To what extent could it be used to furnish material for such a course as that
which is here briefly outlined? So far as arrangement is concerned, it seems
quite suitable. Whatever may be the peculiar characteristics of a bill or a note
as compared with other instruments used for a similar purpose, the best way to
approach the subject seems to be through an understanding first of all of the dis-
tinctive form of the negotiable instrument and of the methods used in transferring
it to another. Later in the course, in considering the holder in due course, the
rights, powers, and privileges of a holder of other instruments might well be
discussed. For such a discussion, no material is here provided. Finally, the
liabilities of the different parties to the instrument might be compared briefly
with those of parties to the other credit instruments on the basis of the more
extended discussion of their functions in the other law school courses mentioned.
Although such a credit course as that suggested involves no very great addi-
tion of material to that in the present casebook, it involves a considerable
change in point of view, that is, in the attempt to give the student a new and
perhaps more useful focus for his work in this field.
Although the usefulness of any casebook depends upon its adaptability to the
method of attack upon the subject which the teacher prefers, the present volume
provides a good arrangement of material for either of the approaches to Bills and
Notes which have been undertaken or suggested. Business men are evolving
new and more complex credit devices for the exigencies arising in the pur-
chase and sale of the newer commodities; cases regarding these will doubtless
concern the courts in the future. Doubtless casebooks will some day appear,
based on a functional approach to the credit field, with full collections of cases
on the various topics which should be related therein. But at least until that
day, the present casebook will, it is believed, prove very satisfactory, as a sound
selection of cases covering the groundwork of the field of Bills and Notes.
RoSwELL MAGILL
University of Chicago Law School
Democracy's International Law. By Jackson H. Ralston. Washington, John
Byrne & Company, 1922. pp. 165.
This is essentially a book of protest against what is called international law,
which the author finds to be largely the embodiment of immorality and anti-
social practices akin to anarchy. The author is no tyro in the field of knowl-
edge which he so scathingly criticizes. With a respected professional connec-
tion with international law, as American Agent in the well-known Pious Fund
Case, as the Umpire of the Italian-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission and
the author of some of its most learned awards, as a practitioner of many years
standing, his views cannot be dismissed as the utterances of the impractical and
misinformed reformer. His attack is directed against the irresponsible State,
which he finds the subject of international law, and the so-called legalization
of what he regards as the lawlessness of its acts of aggression. He points out
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that what is called robbery and murder in all systems of private law is seemingly
ennobled as the fulfillment of national aspirations when undertaken by a group
sufficiently large to be called a nation. His protest is aimed against a system
which could legalize such practices and dignify results flowing from them by
the name of law. In his view all the so-called laws of war, which is the nat-
ural culmination of the international state of unrestrained irresponsibility, are
merely lawless practices which it is blasphemy to call law. He finds "true inter-
national law" in those rules of right living which should govern nations no less
than individuals and demands of the votaries of international law a ministra-
tion of these principles and rules. He finds, for example, in the division of
China into spheres of influence among the larger Powers a violation of a "natural
international law of nations," the punishment for which is "absolutely certain."
He manifests his lawyer's respect for sanctions by essaying to show that vio-
lations of these "fundamental" laws-which we would characterize as rules of
morality-meet just retribution, eventually if not at once, and he cites the ulti-
mate destruction of great empires. He attacks the conception of "vital inter-
ests," independence and national honor as deceptive excuses for the irresponsible
State to exert its uncontrolled will upon less fortunate or weaker nations. He
points out the futility of international courts as an agency for peace, because
the underlying principles which they accept as law are themselves the negation
of law. He says, for example, that the following "vicious propositions" would
today "be accepted by a court":
"A state is a non-moral creation, only to be held responsible to others for its
actions by its own consent.
"A state possesses such a right of sovereignty as enables it by force if it can
to impose its will on other states without being judicially accused of wrong for
so doing.
"A state must judge for itself what affects its own honor, vital interests or
independence.
"A state, after a successful war, has a right to impose its will upon the
vanquished.
"A state, provided it has sufficient power, may possess interests within thejurisdiction of another state and dictate the management of its affairs.
"A state may acquire from an alien conqueror complete jurisdiction over a
vanquished people, violence creating title."
Much as we might be disposed to agree with the criticism of a system which
necessarily invites war as the ultina ratio and then legalizes its consequences,
it is not believed that international law is the proper focus of the criticism.
Law is a science which merely follows the facts, historical, social, and economic,
and records that which society and societal agents accept and enforce as binding.
Much of this, even in municipal law, is essentially immoral, as for example that
the State can do no legal wrong and cannot be sued. Yet so long as societal agents
enforce that rule, it must be regarded as law. Mr. Ralston's objection is more
properly directed against an international political and economic system which
embodies so many practices and results that are in domestic affairs regarded as
illegal, immoral, or anarchic, but which legally are still privileged internationally;
yet even temporary peace seems preferable to permanent var, and for this
reason international law has found it necessary to give legal effect to the prac-
tical consequences of facts. It is quite true that a lack of international organ-
ization, with certain mores of immorality, has permitted nations to be their
own plaintiffs, judges and sheriffs, with the result that jungle law is perpetuated.
The victory of law over violence has been slow even in municipal law. But, in
so far as belligerent relations are concerned, the cure lies in the direction of a
change of the mores by education of public opinion to the realization that the
present system of international unfair competition not only leads inevitably to
war but that with growing effectiveness of the means of destruction the very
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existence of the human race is at stake. Thoughtful men realize that it is now
a race between education in the interest of general self-preservation, and gen-
eral destruction. But Mr. Ralston's criticisms of law are reminiscent of the
contests waged by the school of "natural law" which also had a theory that only
that which was "fundamentally right" was law. This, it is believed, confuses
ethics with law. Moreover, while alleged violations of this "fundamental" law
can frequently be shown to be disastrous to the violator, it by no means follows
that unjust aggression always meets its just reward. On the contrary, a glance
at the empires of the world might show that aggression seems to pay; and even if
in due time these empires may collapse from internal or external causes it would
not be provable that this is a direct consequence of their aggression. It seems
that Mr. Ralston makes too great a demand on international law when he requires
that it regard as illegal those acts and their consequences which do not respond
to the highest conceptions of ethics and morality. International law might thus
become even weaker than it is ' and it would not thereby make the contribution
to decency which Mr. Ralston demands of it. The remedy lies in educating
public opinion to an appreciation of the fact that both morality and self-interest
demand a different conception of international relations, which international
law would then gladly record and apply. The reading of this .hook in picturing
the existing order in international relations will do much to afford that very
education which is so much needed.
EDWIN M. BORCHARD
Yale University Law School
Common Law Marriage and Its Development itn the United States. By, Otto E.
Koegel. Washington, John Byrne & Co., 1922. pp. 179.
In the pages of this book the author makes no contribution to the solution of
the problems presented by the existence of common-law marriages in the United
States nor does he present any material which is at all new or original. The
entire volume is summed up in one paragraph which extends from the bottom
of page eight to the middle of page ten. Here the author indicates (i) that com-
mon-law marriages have not been valid in England since I753; (2) that such mar-
riages were valid in England before that date; (3) that such marriages were
invalid at common law for possessory purposes; (4) that such marriages were
invalid in some of the American Colonies and contrary to legislation and policy
of all colonies; (5) that the earlier decisions in the United States are against
the validity of common-law marriages, but that the later ones, following some
dicta of Chancellor Kent's in i8o9, hold that such marriages are valid, and (6)
that the decisions in this country on the subject are poorly considered and are
at variance with each other, and that (7) such marriages are opposed by the
American Bar Association, the Commission on Uniform State Laws and "all
modern authorities on Sociology, Marriage, and kindred subjects." The one
hundred and sixty pages which follow add nothing to this paragraph. They
simply expand the obvious by quotations from cases and textbooks which are
well known. Fully half the book is made up of quotations. A great portion
of the rest of the text consists of sentences introducing or connecting these
quotations.
ALBERT Ln n t
New Haven, Connecticut
